Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 50 | Number 4

Article 3

1-1-2010

After Heller: What Now for the Second
Amendment
Jeffrey M. Shaman

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey M. Shaman, After Heller: What Now for the Second Amendment, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1095 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

AFTER HELLER: WHAT NOW FOR THE SECOND

AMENDMENT?
Jeffrey M. Shaman*

I.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, decided in 2008, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled by a five-to-four
vote that the Second Amendment of the Constitution protects
an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with
service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.'
Accordingly, the Court struck down a District of Columbia
law that banned the possession of handguns and required
lawfully owned firearms to be kept unloaded and dissembled
or bound by a trigger lock, unless they were located in a place
of business or used for lawful recreational activities.'
The Heller decision was a severe departure from
precedent. Sixty-nine years prior to Heller, the Court ruled
in United States v. Miller that the Second Amendment did not
protect an individual right to bear arms for purely private,
civilian purposes. 3 The Court reaffirmed Miller4 in 1980, and
over the years numerous state and federal courts have relied

*Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The
author is grateful to Andrew Daar for the excellent research assistance he
provided for this article.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The vote reflected
the Court's usual conservative-liberal split, with Justice Kennedy joining the
conservative side on this occasion. See id. at 2783. In addition to Justice
Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas and Alito joined
Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion that
was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion. Id.
2. Id.
3. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
4. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
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Miller in upholding gun control laws.5
Because the ruling in Heller concerned a District of
Columbia law, the big question that remains is whether the
Second Amendment-and its newly found right to bear arms
that is not connected to service in a militia-is incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.
The Bill of Rights, which consists of the first ten amendments
of the Constitution, applies directly to the federal
government, not to the states. The various provisions in the
Bill of Rights that pertain to the states do so only if the
Supreme Court rules that they are incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.
In 1875, the Court ruled in United States v. Cruikshank
that the Second Amendment has no effect other than to
restrict the powers of the national government.6 The Court
reaffirmed that holding in Presser v. Illinois,7 and Miller v.
Texas,' the latter of which proclaimed that it was well settled
that the restriction of the Second Amendment operated only
upon federal authority and had "no reference whatsoever" to
state laws. 9
Those three cases, however, were decided at a relatively
early date in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment-a
time when the Supreme Court took the position that virtually
nothing was incorporated by that Amendment. In subsequent
years, the Court began incorporating various provisions in
the Bill of Rights one by one and applying them to the states
through a process known as "selective incorporation." 10 The
Court has since incrementally incorporated most of the Bill of
Rights' provisions to apply to the states. In fact, only five
provisions in the Bill of Rights have not been incorporated.
Aside from the Second Amendment, the four provisions in the
Bill of Rights that have never been incorporated to apply to
5. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It was not until
2001 that a federal court of appeals ruled that the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to bear arms unconnected with service in a militia.
See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). After Emerson, a
number of Courts of Appeals declined to adopt the position the Fifth Circuit had
advocated regarding the Second Amendment. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2823 n.2.
6. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
7. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
8. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
9. Id.
10. See

ERwIN CHEMERINSKY,

POLICIES 5040 05 (3d ed. 2006).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
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the states are:
(1) The Third Amendment, 1 which prohibits the
quartering of soldiers in one's home;
(2) The Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a
grand jury in criminal cases;
(3) The Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in a
civil case; and
(4) The prohibition of excessive fines that is part of
the Eighth Amendment. 2
The rest of the Bill of Rights has been incorporated and
applies to the states. Given the evolution of the incorporation
doctrine, it is possible that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms should now be incorporated to apply to the states.
According to this line of thought, the holding in Cruikshank
has been all but overruled, and the modern concept of
incorporation calls for extending the Second Amendment to
the states.
While the Heller Court noted that the
incorporation of the Second Amendment was not at issue, it
nonetheless alluded to the possibility of incorporation in
footnote 23: "With respect to Cruikshank'scontinuing validity
on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we
note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did
not apply against the States and did not engage in the sort of
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later
cases."

13

Since Heller was decided, three federal courts of appeals
have addressed the Second Amendment incorporation
question. The Second Circuit, in Maloney v. Cuomo, 4 and the
Seventh Circuit, in NRA v. City of Chicago,15 took the position
that the lower federal courts must adhere to Cruikshank until
it is overruled by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, a
contrary position was taken by the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke
v. King, which held that the Due Process Clause of the
11. This amendment, though, has never been incorporated because a Third
Amendment case has never been presented to the Supreme Court. If such a
case did arise, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court would incorporate
the Third Amendment and apply it to the states. Id.
12. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11. (discussing these four unincorporated
provisions).
13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
14. Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009).
15. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Fourteenth Amendment does incorporate the Second
Amendment so as to apply it to the states. 1 6 It should be
noted, though, that in Nordyke the court went on to rule that
a county ordinance making it a misdemeanor to bring a
firearm or ammunition onto county property did not violate
the Second Amendment, which allows the prohibition of
firearm possession in sensitive places. In NRA, the Seventh
Circuit felt duty-bound to follow Cruikshank because the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if one of its
precedents has "direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in another line of decisions, the Court
of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to the Supreme Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions. " " Likewise, the Second Circuit took the exact
same position in Maloney.'
But in Nordyke, the Ninth
Circuit took a contrary position, based on its reading of
footnote 23 of Heller,9 which the court took as implying that
there was no direct precedent on point concerning the
question of incorporation.20 It appears that this split among
the federal circuits will be definitively resolved by the
Supreme Court, which recently granted a writ of certiorariin
the NRA matter.21
16. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009).
17. NRA, 567 F.3d at 857 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
18. Maloney, 554 F.3d at 59 ("[wlhere, as here, a Supreme Court precedent
'has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to the Supreme Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions' ").
19. See supra p. 103 (quoting footnote 23 of Heller).
20. Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 457, n.16.
Because, as Heller itself points out, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n.23, Cruikshank
and Presser did not discuss selective incorporation through the Due
Process Clause, there is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point
that bars us from heeding Heller's suggestions. Cf Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104
L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
controls .

. . .").

But see Maloney, 554 F.3d at 58-59 (concluding that

Presserforecloses application of the Second Amendment to the states).
Id.
21. The Seventh Circuit combined NRA with another case, Mc Donald v.
City of Chicago, No. 08-C-3645, 2008 WL 5111112 (N.D.Ill. Dec 4, 2008). After
the Seventh Circuit's decision in NRA, petitions for certiorariwere filed in both
cases. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorariin McDonald, 130
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If the Supreme Court does decide to incorporate the
Second Amendment and apply it to the states, an interesting
question arises as to whether to use the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 2 or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 23 as the
means of incorporation. In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases,
the very first Fourteenth Amendment case to reach the
Supreme Court, the Court gave an extremely cramped
reading to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
precluded using it to recognize fundamental rights as entitled
to constitutional protection.24 This interpretation cut short
any promise the Privileges or Immunities Clause might have
had to incorporate provisions in the Bill of Rights and apply
them to the states. Indeed, the Court's interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was so circumscribed in the
Slaughter-House Cases as to render the Clause virtually
useless. As Justice Field proclaimed in dissent, the majority's
interpretation left the Clause "a vain and idle enactment,
which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage. "25
After the Slaughter-House Cases, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause laid "vain and idle" for 126 years, ignored
by the Supreme Court as a source of constitutional rights.2 6
In the meantime, however, the Court turned to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a kind of
substitute for the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
could be used to recognize fundamental rights and
incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights to be applied to the
states.2 7 In 1908, the Court acknowledged in Twining v. New
Jersey that some provisions in the Bill of Rights might be
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.2" Later, in
Fiske v. Kansas, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
encompassed the First Amendment rights to freedom of
S. Ct. 48 (2009).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
25. Id. at 38 (Field, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION
AND REALITY 230-37 (2001).

28. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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speech, press, and religion.29 Then, in 1933, the Court held in
Powell v. Alabama that the denial of counsel in a capital case
violated the Due Process Clause because the assistance of
30
counsel is a fundamental right.
By the 1960s, the process of "selective incorporation" was
in full swing. When the Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana
in 1968, many of the proscriptions contained in the Bill of
Rights had been applied to the states and the Court readily
admitted that in determining the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, it increasingly looked to the Bill of Rights for
guidance. 3 ' One by one, most of the provisions contained in
the Bill of Rights have been deemed to be "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice" that are essential to due
process of law.3 2
Given this evolution of the law, it would seem that if
incorporation of the Second Amendment is to be achieved, it
would be through the Due Process Clause. However, in 1999,
the situation became more complicated when the Supreme
Court executed a surprising about-face in Saenz v. Roe.3 3
There, the Court revived the Privileges or Immunities Clause
by ruling that there is a fundamental right to travel from one
state to another that is encompassed within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.3 4
The Court explained that the right to travel from state to
state is "firmly embedded in our jurisprudence," but the
specific constitutional source of the right has not always been
identified. 5 The Saenz Court specifically designated the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as the source of that right.36
The decision in Saenz was particularly surprising
because in a number of previous decisions the Court ruled
that the right to travel from one state to another was a
fundamental right protectable under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The Saenz Court
easily could have continued to rely upon the Equal Protection
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
Id. at 148.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 510-11.
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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Clause to protect the right to travel interstate, but chose
instead to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a
source of protection for that right. In doing so, the Court once
again breathed life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
which had been smothered by Slaughter-House Cases some
126 years before.
Although surprising, Saenz was theoretically sound for
several reasons.
First, it resuscitated a constitutional
provision that had been incorrectly nullified years before.
The aspect of the Slaughter-House Cases that extinguished
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was wrong and cried out
to be corrected. Second, it makes more sense, both textually
and historically, to locate the right to migrate within the
Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Equal
Protection Clause. At the time of the Slaughter-House Cases,
there was common agreement that the right to travel was a
"privilege" of citizenship."' The Supreme Court, therefore,
should be commended for relocating the fundamental right to
travel to a revitalized Privileges or Immunities Clause.
If the Supreme Court is now inclined to incorporate the
Second Amendment so as to apply it to the states, Saenz
opens the door to the possibility of achieving that result
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process
Clause." Or the Court may prefer, if inclined to incorporate
the Second Amendment, to continue to use the Due Process
Clause as the engine of incorporation.
On the other hand, there is an intriguing possibility that
a majority of the Court will not be willing to incorporate the
Heller interpretation of the Second Amendment. Heller was a
five-to-four decision, with the four dissenting justices
asserting that the Second Amendment only protects an
individual right to bear arms when it is connected to service
in a militia.4 ° Those four justices might take the position that
even if the Second Amendment is incorporated and applied to
38. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04.
39. It is interesting to note that Justice Thomas remarked in his dissenting
opinion in Saenz that because he believes that "the demise of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of
our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence," he "would be open to reevaluating
its meaning in an appropriate case." Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
40. See supra note 1.
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the states, it only protects the right to bear arms in
connection with service in a militia. If just one of the justices
from the Heller majority votes against incorporation, there
will be a splintered decision incorporating the Second
If this
Amendment, but not the Heller version of it. 4
occurred, states would not be foreclosed from prohibiting
individuals from possessing firearms unconnected with
military service, and state laws banning possession of
firearms would be upheld as constitutional. Thus, a different
version of the Second Amendment would apply to state laws
than the version that applies to the District of Columbia and
other federal laws.
II.
If the Supreme Court does choose to incorporate the
Second Amendment to apply to the states, a large question
arises as to what exactly the Second Amendment prohibits.
In Heller, the Court made it quite clear that the Second
Amendment does not provide an absolute right to bear arms;
while some regulations of arms are still permissible, others
are not. Where, then, will the line be drawn?
In Heller itself, the Court struck down a District of
Columbia law banning any and all possession of handguns-a
law that the Court clearly considered an extreme measure
Indeed, the Court
well beyond national norms.4 2
characterized the D.C. law as a ban on "an entire class of
'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society" for
Moreover, the ban
the lawful purpose of self-defense.4 3
extended "to the home, where the need for defense of self,

41. For a similarly splintered decision, see Apodaca v. Oregon in which
eight justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to
the state and five justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
requires jury unanimity. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
However, Justice Powell took the position that while the Sixth Amendment
requires jury unanimity in federal trials and the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the states to provide jury trials for serious crimes, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate all of the elements of a jury trial within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment and does not require jury unanimity. Id. at
404-05 (Powell, J., concurring). As a result of the splintered vote, the Court
concluded that while jury unanimity is required in federal trials, it is not
required in state trials. Id. at 404.
42. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008).
43. Id. at 2817.
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family, and property is most acute.""
"Few laws in the
history of our Nation," the Court concluded, "have come close
to the severe restriction of the District's handgun ban."45
Taking a cue from the Court's view of the D.C. law,
Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested that the most sensible
reading of Heller is that it struck down a proscription that
was a "national outlier," a "draconian" regulation of firearms
far beyond the consensus supported by a strong majority of
Americans. 46 From this perspective, less extreme gun control
laws would be well within the scope of permitted regulation
under the Second Amendment.
The Heller Court ruled that the Second Amendment must
be interpreted according to its original meaning when first
adopted in 1791. 47
Following this originalist mode of
analysis, the Court readily acknowledged that not all firearm
regulations contravene the Second Amendment. The Court
stated that the Second Amendment, like the First, is not
unlimited, and does not protect the right to bear arms "for
any sort of confrontation." 4 As an historical matter, the
Court noted, commentators and courts from Blackstone
through the 19th-century have "routinely explained that the
right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose."4 9 More specifically, the Court said:
Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and
50
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
The Court also expressly recognized "another important
limitation on the right to keep and carry arms" by adhering to
the decision in United States v. Miller,5 1 which held that the
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2818. See also id. at 2820 (characterizing the D.C. law as a
.severe restriction").
46. Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold,
122 HARv. L. REV.246, 263 (2008).
47. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783.
48. Id. at 2799.
49. Id. at 2816.
50. Id. at 2816-17.
51. Id. at 2817. Anticipating an objection to this position, the Court
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Second Amendment only protected those weapons that were
in "common use at the time of its adoption."5 2 According to
the Miller Court, this limitation supports the "historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and
unusual weapons.'""
The Heller Court stressed that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms revolves around self-defense, especially in
the home.5 4 It wrote that "the inherent right of self-defense
has been central to the Second Amendment right,"55 and that
the home is "where the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute."56
It has been noted that Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Heller did not specify which standard of review-strict or
intermediate scrutiny-should be applied in Second
Amendment cases.57 While Justice Scalia's opinion did note
that minimal scrutiny would be inappropriate to use in a
case, such as Heller, involving an enumerated constitutional
right, it declined to choose between strict and intermediate
scrutiny, observing only that the D.C. law in question fails
constitutional muster under either standard. 8
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's opinion emphatically
rejected any interest-balancing approach to interpreting the

observed that:
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military
service-M-16 rifles and the like-may be banned, then the Second
Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.
But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the
Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens capable of
military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they
possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a
militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require
sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed,
it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against
moder-day bombers and tanks.
But the fact that modern
developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory
clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the
right.
Id. at 2817.
52. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
53. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Michael P. O'Shea, Federalismand the Implementation of the Right to
Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 216 (2008).
58. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18.
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Second Amendment; it declared that the Second Amendment
"necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table," thus
precluding laws that prohibit possession of handguns that
may be used for self-defense in the home.59 In Justice Scalia's
eyes, the Second Amendment precludes balancing because it
"elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home."' Hence, his opinion flatly refused to take a balancing
approach to determine the permissible limitations that may
be placed on the right to bear arms. 61
How then would Justice Scalia determine which firearm
regulations are permissible under the Second Amendment?
Evidently, he would do so by turning once again to the
original meaning of the Second Amendment when it was
adopted in 1791. Firearm regulations that are shown to have
an originalist pedigree would pass the Scalia test of
constitutionality, but those of more recent vintage would meet
Scalia's axe. Thus, weapons in common use at the in 1791
would be within the Second Amendment's scope of protection,
but those of more recent invention would not.
In Heller, Justice Scalia's rejection of balancing was an
extreme deviation from the Court's well-established
jurisprudence. By the mid-twentieth century, balancing had
become the Court's predominant mode of constitutional
adjudication in cases involving both unenumerated and
enumerated rights.
Justice Scalia, however, has never
accepted the Court's modem method of adjudication,
believing instead that the Constitution should be strictly
Heller
interpreted according to its original meaning.63
marked the first time a majority of the Supreme Court signed
onto an opinion taking such a decidedly originalist slant,'
and it is debatable whether a majority of the Court would
agree to take an originalist approach when deciding more
specifically what the Second Amendment proscribes in regard
59. Id. at 2822.
60. Id. at 2821.
61. Id. at 2821-22.
62. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism,47 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
63. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
852-54 (1989); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 37-41 (1997).

64. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 254.
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to gun control regulations.
Decided by the slimmest of
majorities, Heller leaves originalism in a precarious position,
especially because interpreting the Second Amendment
according to its original meaning is an extremely haphazard
way of deciding what gun control regulations are
constitutionally permissible in today's world.
Since Heller was decided, there have been a number of
federal court decisions upholding laws that restrict the
possession of guns and other weapons. The federal courts
have upheld regulations prohibiting possession of machine
guns,6 5 sawed-off shotguns,6 6 armor-piercing bullets,67
nunchaku,' and pipe bombs. 69 The federal courts have also
upheld laws that prohibit bringing firearms or ammunition
onto county property,7 ° prevent convicted felons from
possessing firearms,7 1 prohibit possession of a firearm with
an obliterated serial number, 72 and prohibit making a
73
materially false statement in trying to purchase a firearm.
United States v. Marzzarella74 is illustrative of how the
lower federal courts have construed Heller. In Marzzarella, a
federal district court in Pennsylvania upheld the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits
knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial
number. 1
The defendant in the case asserted that under
Heller:
"the core right of the Second Amendment is the private
possession of firearms for use in defense of hearth and
home" and "the only limitations on the right to keep and
bear arms identified by the [Supreme] Court were those
limitations in effect at the time of the enactment of the
Second Amendment."7 6
Because serial numbers had not come into use at that time,
65. United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008).
66. Id.
67. Kodak v. Holder, 342 F. App'x (4th Cir. 2009).
68. Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009).
69. United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2009).
70. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009).
71. United States v. Smith, No. 04-229, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47382 (E.D.
Pa. 2009).
72. United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
73. United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Me. 2008).
74. Marzzarella,595 F. Supp. 2d 596.
75. Id. at 597.
76. Id. at 598 (brackets from original omitted).
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the defendant claimed that § 922(k) violated the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms.7 7
The district court disagreed and found nothing in Heller
that compelled the conclusion that § 922(k) was
unconstitutional. 8 Noting that the law struck down in Heller
was far broader in scope than § 922(k), the court described
the § 922(k) regulation as "practically negligible" in
comparison to the complete ban on firearms struck down in
Heller.79 As the court pointedly observed, firearms with
obliterated serial numbers are of no particular use to the
ordinary law-abiding citizen who intends to have a firearm
for a lawful purpose, such as defense of hearth and home. °
To the contrary, "such weapons hold special value only for
those individuals who intend to use them for unlawful
activity."8 ' Therefore, the court explained, § 922(k) served
the government's interest in discouraging the availability of
untraceable firearms and ensuring that they do not fall into
the hands of individuals inclined to use them for unlawful
purposes."2 In the court's view, § 922(k) was a narrowly
tailored regulation that left ample opportunity for lawabiding citizens to own and possess guns within the
parameters recognized in Heller."3
In addition to federal decisions, it is also instructive to
consider state court decisions interpreting state constitutional
provisions that protect the right to bear arms. Forty-four
state constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing the right
to bear arms. s4 Most of those state constitutional provisions
do not limit the right to bear arms to service in the militia
and many of them expressly link the right to bear arms to
self-defense. 5
Over the years, hundreds of state court
decisions have applied those provisions in cases challenging a
77. Id.
78. Id. at 606.
79. Id. at 599.
80. United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602-03 (W.D. Pa.
2009).
81. Id. at 603.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 606.
84. See Eugene Volokh, State ConstitutionalRights to Keep and Bear Arms,
11 TEx.REV. L. & POL. 191, 193-204 (2006) The six states whose constitutions
do not contain a right to bear arms guarantee are: California, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. See id.
85. See id.
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wide variety of gun control laws.8 6 A review of the decisions
reveals that state courts uniformly apply a deferential rule of
reasonableness to determine whether gun control regulations
violate state constitutional proscriptions. 87 This approach
grants the legislature a good deal of latitude to enact firearms
regulations, the vast majority of which have been upheld as
reasonable measures to protect the public safety.88
In applying their own state constitutions, state courts
have upheld the following: (1) laws that prohibit the
possession of firearms by convicted felons; 9 (2) laws that
prohibit possession of firearms by the mentally ill;9 ° (3) laws
that prohibit the possession of firearms by minors;9' (4) laws
that prohibit non-citizens
from carrying dangerous
weapons; 92 (5) laws that prohibit the carrying of dangerous
weapons without a license; 93 (6) laws that prohibit the
possession of firearms while intoxicated; 94 (7) laws that
prohibit the possession of weapons without serial numbers or
identifying marks; 95 (8) bans on short-barreled and "sawedoff' shotguns; 96 (9) bans on handguns; 97 (10) bans on assault
weapons; 9 (11) bans on concealed weapons; 99 (12) bans on
carrying firearms in liquor establishments; 10 0 and (13) bans
on the transportation of loaded firearms. 101
State courts rarely find that gun regulations violate state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms.
When they do find violations, it is usually because the law in

86. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to BearArms, 17 STAN. L. & POLY
REV. 597, 598 (2006).
87. Id. at 598-602, 612.
88. Id. at 599; see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment,
105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686-87 (2007).
89. People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975).
90. State v. Owenby, 826 P.2d 51 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
91. State v. Boln, 662 S.E.2d 38 (S.C. 2008).
92. State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982).
93. State ex rel. Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).
94. People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1979).
95. State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989).
96. State v. Krantz, 164 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1946); Carson v. State, 247 S.E.2d
68 (Ga. 1978).
97. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984).
98. Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
99. Heidbrink v. Swope, 170 S.W.3d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
100. State v. Dees, 669 P.2d 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
101. State ex rel. W. Va. Div. of Natural Res. v. Cline, 488 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va.
1997).
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question operates as a blanket ban that effectively nullifies
the right to bear arms. 10 2 For example, in City of Lakewood v.
Pillow, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that an ordinance
making it unlawful to possess a dangerous or deadly weapon
was overly broad and thus violated the state constitutional
article guaranteeing a right to keep and bear arms in defense
of home, person, and property. 3 The court noted that the
ordinance was so extensive in scope that it would "prohibit
gunsmiths, pawnbrokers, and sporting goods stores from
carrying on a substantial part of their business[esl," and
would make it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm in a
place of business for the purpose of self-defense. 0 4 Thus, the
ordinance functioned as a blanket ban that could not be
squared with the state constitutional right to bear arms.' 05
On occasion, a few state courts have sustained "asapplied" challenges to gun control laws while upholding the
constitutional validity of the laws. 10 6 This usually occurs
where a law is perceived to be unfair in its application to a
particular person, but otherwise fair and reasonable. For
instance, in Britt v. State, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that a statute prohibiting possession of
firearms by convicted felons could not reasonably be applied
to an ex-felon who had an uncontested record of lifelong
nonviolence, thirty years of law-abiding conduct since his
crime, and seventeen years of responsible, lawful firearm
possession before the statute was enacted. 10 7 Given this
exemplary record, the court concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.'0 8 The court's
question the
not otherwise
did
ruling, however,
The statute therefore
constitutionality of the statute.
remains in effect.
State decisions striking down weapon-regulation laws or
holding that such laws are unconstitutional as applied are
102. Winkler, supra note 87, at 609-12.
103. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1972).
104. Id. at 745.
105. See City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971);
City of Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979).
106. Winkler, supra note 87, at 609-10.
107. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009).
108. Id. at 323; see also, State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Wis. 2003)
(granting as-applied challenge to state law banning possession of concealed
weapons).
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rare. °9 In the vast majority of state cases where gun or
challenged, the courts uphold the
weapon regulations are
10
laws as constitutional. 1
III.
Until relatively recently, it was settled as a matter of law
that the Second Amendment protected the right to bear arms
only in connection with service in a militia. In a 1939
decision, United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Second Amendment did not protect an individual
right to bear arms for purely private, civilian purposes."'
The Court reaffirmed this ruling in 1980,112 and for over six
decades the lower federal courts have uniformly followed
Miller's interpretation of the Second Amendment. 113 The first
aberration from this pattern did not occur until 2001, when in
United States v. Emerson, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Second Amendment protected an individual right to bear
arms that is not connected to service in a militia." 4 Still,
even after Emerson, a number of federal courts of appeals
have declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
Second Amendment." 5 If Emerson was the first crack in the
structure established by Miller, Heller brought the structure
tumbling down. By the slimmest of majorities, the Supreme
Court in Heller abandoned years of precedent by ruling that
henceforth the Second Amendment will be interpreted as
protecting an individual right to bear arms that is not
connected to service in a militia.
The Heller decision, however, did not speak (except for

109. Winkler, supra note 87, at 612.
110. Id. at 687.
Under the standard uniformly applied by the states, any law that
is a "reasonable regulation" of the arms right is "constitutionally
permissible. Since World War II, state courts have authored hundreds
of opinions using this test to determine the constitutionality of all sorts
of gun control laws. All but a tiny fraction of these decisions uphold the
challenged gun control laws as reasonable measures to protect public
safety.
Id.
111. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
112. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
113. See United States v. Cole, 276 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2003).
114. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
115. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2823 n.2 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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brief mention in a footnote) 116 to the question of
incorporation. As previously discussed, in 1875, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Cruikshank, held that the Second
Amendment has no effect other than to restrict the powers of
the national government. 117 While that ruling was reaffirmed
in two other cases from the late 1800s, 118 incorporation of
other provisions in the Bill of Rights has proceeded apace
since that time, so that by now, all but a few of the provisions
in that document have been incorporated. If the Supreme
Court is inclined to incorporate the Second Amendment, it
now has the option of using either the Due Process Clause or
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to accomplish that goal." 9
Of course, if the Supreme Court does choose to
incorporate the Second Amendment, a large question remains
regarding its exact requirements. If applied to the states,
Heller would negate any state law operating as a blanket ban
Short of that, though, there is
on firearm possession.
considerable uncertainty as to what the Second Amendment
would require of the states. The Heller Court itself declared
that nothing therein "should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms." 120 Before Heller, both state and

federal courts upheld a wide variety of weapons regulations
on the ground that they were appropriate means to protect
the public safety. Many of those rulings may remain
undisturbed by Heller, but some may not. Only one thing
now seems certain-much more litigation concerning the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is bound to occur.

116. See supra p. 103 (discussing footnote 23 from Heller).
117. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
118. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535, 538 (1894).
119. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.

120. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.

